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Hybridity as a process of technology’s ‘translation’: Customizing a national 
electronic patient record  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores how national Electronic Patient Record (EPR) systems are 
customized in local settings and, in particular, how the context of their origin plays 
out with the context of their use. It shows how representations of healthcare 
organizations and of local clinical practice are built into EPR systems within a 
complex context whereby different stakeholder groups negotiate to produce an EPR 
package that aims to meet both local and generic needs. The paper draws from 
research into the implementation of the National Care Record Service, a part of the 
National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT), in the English National 
Health Service (NHS). The paper makes two arguments. First, customization of 
national EPR is a distributed process that involves cycles of ‘translation’, which span 
across geographical, cultural and professional boundaries. Second, ‘translation’ is an 
inherently political process during which hybrid technology gets consolidated. The 
paper concludes, that hybrid technology opens up possibilities for standardization of 
healthcare. 
Keywords: UK, translation, hybridity, customization, EPR, technology, healthcare 
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Introduction 
Electronic Patient Record (EPR) systems can be developed within and by healthcare 
organizations or, more commonly, they can be bought as generic software products 
(Davidson & Chiasson, 2005; Greenhalgh et al., 2009; Sawyer, 2000; Williams & 
Pollock, 2008). The latter give clients the chance to get software that embodies ‘best 
practices’ and also standards such as technical, procedural, output oriented and 
terminological that enable coordination, prescribe work and provide a shared 
language that allows consistency of the messages being exchanged (Boulus & Bjorn, 
2010; Brunsson et al., 2012; Hanseth et al., 2006; Hanseth & Lundberg, 2001; 
Timmermans & Berg, 2003; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Wagner & Newell, 2004; 
Yeow & Sia, 2008). Homegrown EPR systems are developed to the needs of a 
healthcare organization. Software packages are designed to a market, not to a client, 
requiring further adaptation (customization) to local needs (Williams & Pollock, 
2008).  
Customization cuts across the locale where EPR is designed and the locale where it is 
adopted and put into use. There is a substantial body of literature from Information 
Systems and Science and Technology Studies (STS) that discusses the outcomes, and 
to some extent the process, of EPR implementations at a local or national level 
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Davidson & Chiasson, 2005; Greenhalgh et al., 2008; Håland, 
2012; Hanseth et al., 2006; Hanseth & Lundberg, 2001; Kallinikos, 2010; Jones, 
2003; Lapointe & Rivard, 2005; Oborn et al., 2011; Pollock et al., 2003; Vikkelsø, 
2005; Williams & Pollock, 2008). In most studies customization of EPR is presented 
as being confined to a single organization, the user, with other stakeholders, such as 
developers and suppliers, being external to it (Boulus & Bjorn, 2010; Oborn et al., 
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2011). In this paper we illustrate that the boundaries around EPR customization are 
dispersed and show how the context of origin of an EPR plays out with the context of 
its use and its implications.  
This paper presents findings from research into the implementation of the National 
Care Record Service (NCRS), a part of the NPfIT, into an English hospital. It aims to 
explore how representations of local healthcare organizations and clinical practice are 
built into EPR systems during the process of customization and within a complex 
context whereby different stakeholder groups (service provider, software developers, 
healthcare professionals, governmental organizations etc.) negotiate to produce an 
EPR package that aims to meet both local and generic needs. It contributes in two 
ways to the studies that examine the politics that emerge during health technology 
adaptation taking an STS perspective. First, it shows that customization of health 
technology is not confined to a single locale but is a distributed process that involves 
cycles of translation. The latter may span across geographical, cultural and 
professional boundaries. Second, it demonstrates that translation is an inherently 
political process during which a hybrid technology becomes consolidated. The paper 
argues that translation and hybridity are co-constitutive and concludes that hybrid 
technology could open up possibilities for standardization of healthcare. 
The Politics Of EPR Customization: Translation & Hybridity 
Implementation of EPR is often accompanied by local interventions to accommodate 
it to everyday work practices. Customization, one of these interventions, implies 
making extensive changes in the code of the system and redesigning some of its 
features so that it becomes contextualised to the implementer health organization 
(Bjørn et al., 2009; Davidson & Chiasson, 2005; Davidson & Chismar, 2007; Oborn 
et al., 2011; Williams & Pollock, 2008). Although necessary, customization is often 
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limited as the software’s embodied logic cannot be easily fine-tuned (Kallinikos, 
2010) and because of the power IT suppliers exercise, through invocation of their 
technical expertise, to minimise changes in the provided software (Hislop, 2002). It is 
typical for example for software developers and suppliers to prioritize the technical 
expertise incorporated in software over its usability when implemented in a specific 
organizational context (Sawyer, 2000; Wagner & Newell, 2004). This largely emerges 
because of the distance, physical and literal, between software developers and end 
users. Typically, standard EPR products are developed either in isolation from the 
user or in line with the requirements and the needs of a few organizations only, 
usually the largest, more profitable and innovative, compromising in either case their 
malleability (Pollock et al., 2003; Scott & Kaindl, 2000; Timmermans & Berg, 2003). 
Inevitably, conflicting goals and power plays emerge between software developers 
and user organizations as they negotiate how to customize an EPR and which of its 
embodied ‘best practices’ are actually ‘best’ for the user organization (Davidson & 
Chiasson, 2005; Oborn et al., 2011; Wagner & Newell, 2004; Yeow & Sia, 2008). 
Bjørn et al. (2009) have shown that negotiations between stakeholders are necessary 
before deciding on the elements of a health technology that can be standardized and 
used across contexts and those that need to remain local. Negotiations between 
different groups of the same organization have also been reported as being essential to 
EPR adaptation (Boulus & Bjorn, 2010; Oborn et al., 2011). This is because the 
monolithic culture of EPR, expressed through its embodied standards, contradicts the 
multiple local cultures that exist within a healthcare organization (e.g. clinical/medical 
work, nursing work, administrative work) (Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2003; Wagner & 
Newell, 2004).  
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EPR’s adoption brings about changes into the organization of healthcare professional 
work, for example changes in roles, tasks, skills, modes of collaboration and may 
reinforce trends towards rationalization of medical work and diminished clinical 
discretion (Berg, 1997; Boulus & Bjorn, 2010; Davidson & Chismar, 2007; Vikkelsø, 
2005). It is doubtful however that EPR can attain absolute standardization of work 
(Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2008). The level and extent of changes EPR may reinforce are 
influenced by healthcare professionals’ views on how EPR aligns with their 
professional identity (e.g. their status, relationship with patients etc.) and how it 
impacts on their routines (Jensen & Aanestad, 2006; Jensen & Kjaergaard, 2010).  
A study conducted by Timmermans and Berg (1997) on the introduction of two 
clinical protocols in hospitals has shown that the imposition of standards (in their case 
of clinical protocols but this also applies to standards embodied in health IT) does not 
necessarily impose new structures, roles and processes on clinical staff; neither 
however leaves them intact. Standards incorporate existing routines, power 
configurations and cultural traditions and simultaneously transform them achieving in 
this way ‘local universality’.  
Following this line of argument we show that ‘local universality’ could be attained if 
we consider how technology becomes translated across boundaries, consolidating 
hybrid technology, and what opportunities this opens up for standardization of 
healthcare. We understand customization as a process of ‘translation’. Originating 
from the ‘sociology of translation’ (Callon, 1986) translation implies displacement for 
instance in space, in language, in form or in power (Callon, 1986; Czarniawska & 
Sevon, 2005; Latour, 1987). In his seminal work Callon (1986) has shown that 
translation is a process of creating a network of aligned actors (both human and non-
human beings), which is, ideally, characterised by consensus and common interests. A 
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political process precedes consensus whereby different actors become docile in order 
to meet the purposes of the network, which is typically led by a spokesperson (Callon, 
1986; Star, 1991). We are interested in studying the politics of translation but we take 
the latter as being a highly distributed process, not confined to the limits of a loose 
network, whereby different stakeholders negotiate in order to meet their own ends 
(Star, 1991; Strathern, 1991; Timmermans & Berg, 2003). We see translation as being 
a polemic process not necessarily leading to consensus or harmony let alone to 
durability, as Callon’s paper also illustrates (Strathern, 1991). 
The central idea behind translation is that human beings, technologies and interests 
are not simply ‘transferred’ across temporal and spatial boundaries; neither do they 
remain intact, as if they had a predetermined destiny (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1988, 
2007; Jensen & Winthereik, 2002). Rather as they are being transferred they 
simultaneously get translated and transformed. Translation has a material (embodied) 
nature (Czarniawska & Sevon, 2005, p.9) for it is made possible through the 
implication of devices. These enable ideas to travel across boundaries by lifting them 
up from their context (dis-embeddedness), by inscribing or embodying them into a 
material artefact (objectification) and by allowing them to become appropriated and 
make sense to different other settings (re-embededdness) (Czarniawska & Sevon, 
2005). This is an iterative process of in-scriptions and de-scriptions (Timmermans & 
Berg, 1997), which allows new ideas to be produced and reproduced as they travel 
across boundaries. Sociologists see translation as being primarily a process; we are 
interested in this paper in also finding out what becomes consolidated (even 
temporarily) in the process of translation, namely hybrids.  
A major debate in the literature on hybridity concerns their nature and origins. Some 
suggest that hybridity is a combination of existing entities that are typically found 
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separately (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bloomfield & Hayes, 2009; Miller et al., 
2008). Metaphors such as ‘layered hybridity’ and ‘grafted hybridity’ have been used 
to illustrate hybridity as a process of bringing together different elements in varied 
ways (Bloomfield & Hayes, 2009). Other authors argue that hybridity is the 
construction of a new entity that reflects the entities, which it comes from (e.g. spaces, 
stakeholders etc.) but is not identical to them (Rutherford, 1998). Hybrids constitute 
the production of something new. The first definition looks mostly into the production 
of hybrids whereas the second focuses on the product (the hybrid). In our paper we go 
beyond this distinction showing that EPR is a hybrid technology that becomes 
consolidated, even if temporarily, amidst a complex customization process. 
Hybrids are heterogeneous and political in as long as they emerge from negotiation 
and struggle between pre-existing entities (Pieterse, 2001; Shimoni & Bergmann, 
2006). As Haraway (1991) suggests hybrids constitute a polemic against well-
established dichotomies such as human-animal; organism-machine; physical-non-
physical. They are a manifestation of fragmented identities and of the impossibility of 
being a unified One. Hybridity is central to the sociology of translation (Strathern, 
1991). According to sociology of translation, we need to move away from constructed 
dualisms such as social versus technical or human versus non-human towards a view 
that sees any being, such as an EPR, as a hybrid (Latour, 1993; Strathern, 1991). That 
is as an outcome of a series of translations that have occurred over time and space and 
have involved various beings. Indeed, Latour (1987, p 267) defines translation as 
‘modification, deflections, betrayals, additions and appropriations that displace 
subjects and objects into someone or something otherwise’. This ‘other’ is a result of 
translation and constitutes a hybrid. Generally, the relevance of the sociology of 
translation to the study of hybridity has been recognised in the literature (Brigham & 
 8 
Hayes, 2013) and has been supported by a rising interest in the role of technology in 
hybridity (Bloomfield & Hayes, 2009). It is to this growing literature our paper seeks 
to contribute by exploring how the ‘translation’ of EPR – during its local adaptability 
- conditions hybridity and the possibilities hybridity opens up for standardization of 
healthcare.  
The Context of the Study 
The findings we present here are part of a larger study of the evaluation of the NCRS 
implementation in the NHS in England (Klecun et al., 2014; Robertson et al., 2010; 
Sheikh et al., 2011; Takian et al., 2012), which was launched in 2002 by the 
Department of Health (DH). The NCRS was envisaged as an electronic patient record 
to be shared across hospitals in the English NHS (DH, 2006). A multidisciplinary 
team from four UK universities conducted the study. Each university team studied a 
number of secondary healthcare organizations (Acute Trusts (hospitals), Mental 
Health Trusts and Community Hospitals), 12 in total. These organizations were 
chosen because they had begun implementing or would start implementing the NCRS 
during our evaluation. In this paper we present findings from our team’s study of one 
Acute Trust, which for anonymity purposes, we name here Alpha. In 2008 Alpha was 
one of the first hospitals to implement the NCRS system; we could thus conduct a 
longitudinal study, following the NCRS implementation and customization over a 13-
month period.  
A number of stakeholders were involved in customization such as a multinational 
software house that developed the system; a consultancy that provided 
implementation services to Alpha, from now on the Local Service Provider (LSP); 
Connecting for Health (CfH), a directorate of DH responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the NCRS at national level and Alpha’s implementation team (See 
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figure 1). The latter consisted managers (programme, project, IT etc.) and healthcare 
professionals (senior and junior doctors, nurses, matrons etc.). Some of the managers 
were contracted to deliver their services for a specific period of time, lacking NHS 
experience; others were permanent members of the hospital. Healthcare professionals 
were working in Alpha well before the commencement of the NCRS.  
<Figure 1 here> 
The NCRS was designed and developed in line with specifications that were set 
centrally by CfH and the LSP and agreed in a contract. The LSP was also in a 
contractual relation with the software house. Both the LSP and the software house had 
vested interest in the timely delivery of the NCRS, as they were paid upon use and 
sign off by the hospital, and were committed to their contractual obligations. 
Although the hospital was the user of the NCRS it was not in a contractual relation 
with any of the involved stakeholders and remained accountable only to the DH. 
Hospital Alpha followed a small-scale approach to the implementation of the NCRS 
system. The system went live in March 2009 in the Radiology and Orthopaedic 
departments, clinics and wards and was mainly used for electronic ordering, 
transferring and reporting of X-Ray requests and results and for other relevant 
supporting processes such as electronic viewing, re-ordering and cancelling of 
requests.  
Research methodology 
Our study aimed to explore how customization of the NCRS was carried out as it 
travelled across a range of stakeholders. It was focused on the politics of technology’s 
adaptation. Although, technology plays a core role as a bearer of politics, this paper 
gives prioritization to human agency, and specifically to stakeholders’ interests and 
considerations as they inscribe their interests and intentions into the technology 
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(Fuller, 2000). To meet this aim we conducted qualitative study following an 
interpretive epistemology (Crotty, 1998). Our interpretive study reconstructs the 
process of translation by showing its embedded politics whilst considering the 
socially and culturally shaped context in which translation is situated. 
We gathered information through semi-structured interviews and documents. We 
conducted 28 interviews in total in two periods. The first period was between May 
and August 2009, a few months after the implementation of the NCRS started, and the 
second period was between March and June 2010. These research periods were 
negotiated and mutually agreed between the researcher and the Chief Information 
Officer and Programme Manager from Alpha. Interviewees included project managers 
(3), training manager (1), programme managers (3), product specialist (1), IT manager 
(1), configuration architect (1), testing lead (1), business analyst (1), business change 
leads (2), doctors (4) and nurses (6). Of these interviews seven were conducted with 
implementation team members in the first period. Sixteen interviews were conducted 
in the second period when the number of users had increased and the Trust had taken 
its implementation further. Interviews with CfH (2), LSP (1) and software house (2) 
were also conducted. Apart from a phone interview, all other interviews were 
conducted in person, were, with a few exceptions, recorded, lasted between 30 and 90 
minutes and were transcribed verbatim.  
Interviewees from each stakeholder group were selected purposively, depending on 
their role and involvement in the implementation of the NCRS, and also in a snowball 
manner based on recommendations from previous interviewees. Due to the small 
scale of implementation of the NCRS there was similarly a small number of users.  
For our interviews we used thematic guides for each stakeholder group. Our research 
was designed and conducted according to NHS research governance frameworks and 
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was approved by an NHS Research Ethics Committee. We received informed consent 
from all participants.  
 We did not ‘follow the actors’, as Callon’s (1986) translation model would typically 
require, for when we started our fieldwork a network, loosely defined, was already 
formed so the process of translation could not be fully accounted (Strathern, 1991). 
Also, as researchers we had to make decisions as to who can be included and who is 
unavoidably excluded from our research. For instance, we interviewed those designers 
who travelled to England for a period of time to work together with Alpha but left 
outside of our study those developers who were based in India. We tell a story on the 
basis of those decisions, accepting in this way that it could be told in many other ways 
(Haraway, 1991; Singleton & Michael, 1993; Star, 1991). 
We analysed our findings manually following a thematic process informed by 
relevant literature and fieldwork (Strauss, 1987). We followed an inductive approach 
to analysis whereby we made systematic readings of our interview transcripts and 
field notes and then compared and contrasted them with the literature leading to the 
creation of themes and sub-themes (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). We initially 
created several themes (e.g. implementation; technology-in-use; customization; power 
and resistance etc.), which were then elaborated, developed and refined to reflect the 
purposes of this paper. Some of the themes that guided our analysis were 
customization process; collaboration across boundaries; politics and negotiations and 
instances of translation. To ensure coherence of data analysis, our analytical themes 
were discussed between the authors and then presented within the larger project team 
for further elaboration. The sections that follow present our findings and analysis. 
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‘Translating’ the NCRS in Alpha  
A key characteristic of NCRS was its centralized character manifested, as we 
described, by the number of contractual relations developed between stakeholders. 
Alpha’s implementation team believed that LSP’s priority was to make the NCRS go 
live timely independently of its appropriateness, quality and durability. This was 
reflected in the contracts that were signed between CfH and LSP and LSP and 
software house, which were directed towards outcomes (delivery) but not primarily 
quality. As we said above, Alpha lacked direct communication and contractual 
relation with software developers and thus was not seen as being the immediate client 
of any of the involved stakeholders despite the fact that they had to sign off the NCRS 
use.  
 ‘We are being pressured [by the LSP and CfH] into accepting suboptimal things and 
they are being pressured to develop and deliver suboptimal products just because of 
the type of pressure that they are under’ (Consultant orthopaedist, Alpha).  
 ‘I think that’s what drives some of the frustration probably from both parties 
sitting at the far end is, you know, if we can’t engage with the customer 
how do we know we’re delivering something that’s going to be beneficial … 
because you’ve not got that direct communication the frustration increases’ 
(Software developer) 
The creation of a chain of contracts made it difficult to create a ‘fit for purpose’ EPR 
system and conditioned opportunities for back-pushing and fragmented responsibility. 
As an IT manager from CfH said it was hard to identify who was responsible for a 
user-unfriendly design: CfH who created the specification; the LSP who oversaw the 
implementation or software developers who designed the system? Different people 
had different views about those questions, as becomes more obvious below, and 
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complexity increased if one considers geographical aspects that became profound in 
NCRS implementation. The NCRS system designers were based in India and had 
limited, if any, knowledge of how the NHS in England is structured and how it works. 
As a result, they developed software that was technically compliant with CfH’s 
specifications but lacked clinical relevance. Alpha’s implementation team and CfH 
both believed that English presence from software developers was necessary to 
expedite changes in the system in a timely manner.  
‘…the problem is that they [software developers] are not healthcare workers and 
they haven’t had that feel of healthcare … I don’t know if India have an NHS 
service like we do, so they probably wouldn’t understand that either. It would be 
a lot easier if they had an understanding of how health organization practices 
worked’ (Configuration architect, Alpha). 
When the hospital’s implementation team embarked on the adoption of the NCRS 
they expected it to be ‘fit-for-purpose’, requiring minimum amendments before its 
use. In practice, however, the NCRS system had to be extensively adapted before 
being adopted. Managers from the implementation team shadowed healthcare 
professionals in Radiology and Orthopaedics so that they could then represent clinical 
work onto the NCRS.  
‘they [i.e. managers from the implementation team] came in to do a process 
mapping as to how our processes worked and how our systems worked and 
what parts of the process could be electronified, if you like, and then went 
away and tried to reproduce our pathways and processes in an electronic 
format’ (Consultant orthopaedist, Alpha). 
During customization hospital managers found out that protocols and standard 
operation procedures did not really reflect local practice and they ‘…didn’t really 
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know to the level of detail what it is people were doing …’ (Project manager). For 
instance, they reported that they encountered clinical practices they could not 
understand (e.g. blood-pressure taken five times in a pathway), workarounds, which 
they understood, but did not know whether (or not) they should be mapped (e.g. 
smartcards left in the terminals to treat patients) and highly varied clinical and 
business processes. Customization was thus carried out by trial and error with 
managers leaving outside of their scope those practices that did not drive clinical 
work. 
Healthcare professionals from the implementation team were also involved in 
customization and specifically in the redesign of clinical forms and in mapping 
clinical processes. Their role was two-fold. First, they had to identify the information 
that needs to be captured and the necessary tasks that need to be carried out for each 
clinical pathway. Second, they had to adjust the central specification, on the basis of 
which the NCRS was developed, to their own clinical work. This entailed interpreting 
and translating the content of the initial specification to clinical language and then 
clinical practice to computer jargon as often design varied from practice.  
‘we [Alpha] do struggle sometimes with interpretation of how they [CfH, LSP, 
software house] deem a design and how we deem a design. … it is quite a hard 
struggle with a lot of the other external organizations to try and communicate our 
point.’ (Configuration architect, Alpha).  
For example initial design of the NCRS rendered orthopaedists personally responsible 
for authorising X-Ray tests for female patients at childbearing age (as defined by the 
system). This task was previously a shared responsibility between clinicians and, 
mostly, radiologists. It also prohibited radiologists from adding additional pieces of 
information to an X-Ray request form; a typical practice under the paper-system. 
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Further, the NCRS kept track of all the changes made to a document without making 
them apparent. Healthcare professionals would have to look for any changes 
manually. These were some of the key items in the customization agenda that 
conditioned negotiations and politics.   
The politics of customization  
Customization was carried out through an ‘Issue Management Process’ (IMP). 
Initiated by the LSP, the IMP was a central process of maintaining a log of problems 
of the system. The hospital raised 940 issues within the first three months from its go-
live date and 1,400 issues within its first year of implementation. Issues emerged 
during both the testing and the use of the system and were reported to the Trust’s IT 
Helpdesk by users and then to the LSP’s Service Desk. The implementation team 
ranked the severity of the raised issues, collected by the Trust’s IT Helpdesk, and 
prioritized them in terms of their importance taking into consideration clinical safety 
issues, number of users affected and potential media interest. Once received the LSP 
would also prioritize the issues raised in terms of whether they were fixable (or not) 
and whether they required a change in the code (or not) and the type of change 
required. These issues were then discussed in web-conferences with all stakeholders 
involved where they would negotiate about the resolution of the raised issues.  
Alpha’s implementation team argued that the stage of implementation influenced the 
prioritization of the issues a hospital raised. For example the ‘Go live’ stage was 
perceived as a critical stage whereby any emerging issues were prioritized whereas 
other issues that emerged pre and post-‘Go-live’ were given less importance. 
As a programme manager at Alpha said CfH and LSP aimed to maintain the ‘design 
ethos’ of the software so that it could be used across hospitals independently of local 
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needs. According to software developers the NCRS system was configurable but in 
the light of the NPfIT the system needed to be standardized.  
‘you don’t want to create a bespoke product either so, you know, you could make 
something for [name of a hospital], that they’ve got some very specific processes 
that then you couldn’t roll it out anywhere else so you have got to be a little bit 
careful’ (Software developer) 
Some adaptations were however made in NCRS after negotiations. These however did 
not always meet the hospital’s requirements. For example, when the implementation 
team asked for X-Ray requests to be generated by the system automatically the 
updated functionality allowed repeat requests automatically populated with the 
information (demographic and clinical) that was inputted last time. Radiologists were 
concerned about the risks this would entail but decided to work around this 
functionality. A consultant attributed this discrepancy to different interpretations 
between the hospital, the LSP and the software developer.  
‘…A lot of the things that have been produced that we’ve asked to use are not 
what we actually asked for. They are their perceptions of what the solution would 
be.’ (Consultant orthopaedist, Alpha). 
Software developers were checking the NCRS’s compliance with the specification 
and declined required changes on the grounds that the software works as designed. 
Alpha was not in agreement with the specification and the subsequent initial design, 
which brought a lot of frustration. A healthcare professional reported that Alpha had 
‘to fight for every single change’ before issues were prioritized and resolved. This 
was largely because of the lack of ‘contractual muscle’, as a senior manager said, to 
demand direct changes to be made in the system. One of the most effective, and for 
some the single, way to negotiate change was to claim that the software raised clinical 
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safety issues and, on this basis, to stop using it. This was for instance the case of 
digital images which when re-opened would lose all the work doctors did on them 
(e.g. marking, annotating etc.). Generally, it was acknowledged that by raising clinical 
safety issues healthcare professionals could exercise power and even bring the NCRS 
implementation to a halt. 
‘The only control we have is to say, stop, this is unsafe. And that’s really the only 
control we have. That makes them jump. They will do things’ (Consultant 
radiologist, Alpha). 
Software developers argued that the politics of customization were conditioned on the 
ethos of the NHS, which they described as being about the power of the institution to 
resist changes in its structure and function and to work towards the maintenance of its 
status quo. Software developers also made reference to the power clinicians had to 
bring NHS programmes of reform to a halt by invoking their clinical expertise and as 
the final users of the NCRS to demand changes before going live.  
‘…you always get into the “I’m not going live unless you do this for me” so 
regardless of the original intention the Trust always have the supplier over a 
barrel… this goes back to the ethos of the NHS, they don’t like to be told what to 
do… you could spend another 10 years trying to find something that you can get 
two clinicians to agree on’ (Software developer) 
As of December 2010, when the implementation should have been finalized, Alpha 
went live with limited functionality of the NCRS system (electronic ordering and 
reporting of X-Ray requests; uploading VT assessments; digitalization of documents). 
After the dismantling of the NPfIT, the digitalisation of the English NHS evolved 
towards a more local procurement and implementation. Alpha continued its own EPR 
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strategy, outside a national programme, but despite progress it has yet to implement a 
hospital-wide EPR.  
Discussion 
The case of Alpha illustrates the politics that emerge when a national EPR becomes 
customized. In this section we discuss two points. First, that translation occurs during 
local adaptation of technology and as the context of technology’s origin plays out 
with the context of its use. To do so we discuss the different boundaries that condition 
translation. Second, we argue that the process of translation consolidates hybrid 
technology, which partly reproduces and partly re-presents original intentions and 
designs. We believe that this provides an illustration of how ‘local universality’ is 
conditioned (Timmermans & Berg, 2003).  
Our first point is that customization of a national EPR is not confined to a single 
locale such as a hospital but is a distributed process that occurs across geographical, 
cultural and professional boundaries. The NCRS travelled across space and cut across 
public and private sector mind-sets and across managerial and professional 
dichotomies. Its journey however was not smooth and neither did it follow a single 
trajectory; it was shaped by negotiations and politics that occurred between the 
different stakeholders. As technology travelled across those boundaries its embodied 
meaning became translated into something other than its original (Czarniawska & 
Sevon, 2005; Latour, 2007).  
Customization of the NCRS occurred across spatial boundaries. It was specified by 
CfH in England and was developed in India. Even before it arrived in hospital Alpha 
the technology, in all its different forms, such as specification, design and software 
had undergone a number of translations with software developers interpreting the 
design into computer language. Its implementation in hospital Alpha required further 
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translations (Latour, 2007). Specifically, clinicians had to put initial builds of the 
system into clinical practice terms, in other words to ‘de-scribe’ or ‘embed’ them 
(Czarniawska, 2008; Timmermans & Berg, 1997), in order to make them meaningful 
for their work and context of use. We have shown for instance how clinicians’ request 
for repeats X-Ray requests was interpreted by designers as repeat requests populated 
with inputted information. Clinicians had to explain why this functionality could 
entail risks and how it needed to change, following a process of ‘inscription’ or dis-
embeddedness whereby clinicians translated clinical practice into a language that can 
then be codified (Czarniawska, 2008). This was not a one-off process but involved 
iterative cycles of translation as the NCRS travelled from software developers to 
Alpha’s implementation team, and then through CfH and the LSP back to developers 
again (Czarniawska & Sevon, 2005). In doing so the NCRS was continuously (re-
)interpreted and (re-)created. Translation seems to be unavoidable considering the 
distance that separates designers from users (Timmermans & Berg, 2003). This 
distance is not only literal- geographical but also metaphorical reflecting absence 
from local context and lack of awareness of its contingencies. We see this process of 
cycles of translation as being not a disruption to implementation but a basis for 
exchanging perspectives, an opportunity for reflecting on ‘how things are done here’ 
and a condition for coming to a consensus. Such process needs not to be avoided but 
accommodated, in terms of time and resources required during customization, in order 
to allow flexibility and to give space for negotiations, and, when necessary, for 
compromises. 
Healthcare professionals played a key role in these cycles of translations. Their 
mediation expands and enriches the concept of ‘clinical engagement’, a commonly 
used term indicating the involvement of clinicians in the adoption of health IT 
 20 
innovation. In our case, clinical engagement means active participation in adapting 
EPR to local context and, in practice, in its re-creation. It thus goes back to early 
theories on a socio-technical approach to IS development (Mumford, 2011). It also 
suggests an emerging hybrid role that clinicians undertook as both users and 
developers of the EPR (Millerand & Baker, 2010; Ramiller, 2005). Further, it 
indicates that the role of spokesperson is particularly challenging in the context of an 
EPR customization. The complexity of clinical work and the diversity of institutions 
and professional groups challenge the ability of a single actor to represent (translate 
and ‘lock’) their diverse interests. As our study has shown without active engagement 
of a range of stakeholders ‘a network’ is perhaps unlikely to stabilize.  
Technology’s translation also occurred across cultural boundaries and specifically 
across public (Alpha) and private sector (LSP, software developers) mentalities. 
These different organizations had different priorities with the LSP aiming to provide 
service in a fast and efficient manner whilst limiting any delays and costs whereas the 
implementer hospital was primarily interested in developing software that met clinical 
needs (Hanseth et al., 1996; Hislop, 2002; Sawyer, 2000). A key mechanism that 
allowed translation to occur was the issue management process. As we have shown 
this was a political process whereby prioritization was decided on the criticality of the 
implementation stage (the closer to the go live the more critical) rather than the 
severity of the raised issue. There was a general reluctance from the LSP side to 
approve extensive customization as this would modify the design ethos that underpins 
NCRS causing also delays in meeting their contractual obligations. It has been 
reported in the literature that software packages embody logic that cannot be easily 
modified (Kallinikos, 2010). Our case suggests that configurability was not a 
technical barrier but a political in that changes in the software impacted the 
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contractual relation suppliers had with CfH and were on this basis resisted. Ultimately 
the decision as to what is ‘best’ for a healthcare organisation to adopt and what is best 
to change is an outcome of negotiations (Bjørn et al., 2009; Oborn et al., 2011; 
Wagner & Newell, 2004).   
As the NCRS was being customized it disrupted existing work cultures, bringing 
alterations in clinicians’ practices and changes in the way in which jurisdictions were 
being divided between clinical groups (Berg, 1997; Boulus & Bjorn, 2010; Davidson 
& Chismar, 2007; Oborn et al., 2011). We have shown for instance that the NCRS 
system took away radiologists’ right to input information to an X-Ray request form 
post-hoc. At the same time the NCRS was intended to reproduce and digitalise the 
existing work cultures and business processes rather than transform them radically.  
The implementation of the NCRS also needed to cut across professional boundaries 
mainly healthcare professionals and IT developers. The case illustrated that each 
group intended to influence the degree and type of customization according to its 
interests. We have shown for instance how clinicians invoked their clinical expertise 
and specifically the discourse on ‘clinical safety’ to insist on changes made in the 
software and even stop the implementation. IT experts used their technical expertise 
to legitimize the NCRS design (Hislop, 2002). Their discourse ‘works as designed’ 
was powerful to obstruct EPR customization. These examples indicate how 
professional knowledge can be mobilized in order to frame customization (Berg et al., 
2003; Timmermans & Berg, 2003) as professionals use it to exercise power over the 
extent and type of changes made in the software (Hislop, 2002; Nicholson & Sahay, 
2004; Walsham, 2001). Professional knowledge was also a way to set boundaries 
over, the otherwise endless, process of translation. For instance, as we showed 
translation would stop when clinicians raised clinical safety concerns.  
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The second point our case illustrates concerns the hybrid nature of technology. Our 
findings suggest that hybridity does not emerge from a combination of two or more 
pre-existing entities (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bloomfield & Hayes, 2009) but from 
their translation. We have shown for instance that the NCRS was not a sum of the 
different perceptions stakeholders had of clinical knowledge and of the NHS but an 
amalgamation of their interpretation, translation and inscription into the NCRS. The 
NCRS became a hybrid technology in that it partly re-presented (presented anew) and 
partly reproduced stakeholders’ interpretations (Rutherford, 1998).  
Four instances of hybridity emerge from our study. First, the NCRS digitalised 
existing clinical practices except those Alpha’s implementation team decided not to 
digitalise due to their limited importance. Second, the NCRS intervened into existing 
relations of power by re-distributing jurisdictions between radiologists and 
orthopaedists and by taking some jurisdictions away from radiologists. This was not a 
substantial transformation of existing power relations but a disruption to them 
(Timmermans & Berg, 1997). Third, it provided additional clinical functionality that 
under the paper system was not offered, for example the possibility for clinicians to 
work on digital images. Fourth, it offered visibility over changes that occurred in 
electronic clinical forms and documents and in this way enabled better electronic 
control. The NCRS was thus a hybrid technology in that it embodied existing 
practices, relations of power and modes of control (albeit slightly transformed) whilst 
adding new possibilities (albeit slightly adapted to fit the local context).  
During customization actors’ interests and requirements often compete and are not 
always (or indeed seem to be seldom) fully accommodated. The production of hybrid 
technology is not an outcome of a failed customization but a way of accommodating 
the competing interests of the involved stakeholders. Precisely because of its hybrid 
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nature, the NCRS, or indeed any hybrid technology, should not be judged against the 
initial design but rather against the way in which the initial design becomes adapted to 
the context of technology’s use; not looking to the past but to the present and the 
future.  
Our final argument is that hybrid technology opens up possibilities for standardization 
of healthcare. The distributed nature of customization suggests that EPR (and its 
embodied standards) becomes dissolved and changed as it goes through cycles of 
translation. We would thus expect its ‘standardizability’ to fade away. Translation 
however also suggests a process in which EPR (and its embodied standards) is neither 
adopted nor rejected per se but is continuously ‘in-use’ (i.e. under translation). 
Translation allows hybrid EPR to be produced and to make sense not only within but 
also across settings increasing in this way its possible ‘standardizability’ and thus also 
its ‘local universality’ (Timmermans & Berg, 1997). This shows the productive power 
of hybridity as it opens up space for creating IT innovations that may be meaningful 
to local healthcare settings. It also suggests that customization is not necessarily an 
obstacle for standardization but could be one of its conditions. This is largely 
depending on who is involved in the cycles of translation, how much influence they 
maintain within the network, what devices they employ, and importantly who makes 
decisions for their termination. The question therefore is not about the desirability of 
hybrid technology, this is often unavoidable in national EPR implementations, but 
about the politics of boundaries and the governance of technology’s translation. 
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